Scheduling Non-Enforceable Contracts Among Autonomous Agents by Tesch, T. & Aberer, Karl
Scheduling Non-Enforceable Contracts Among Autonomous Agents
Thomas Tesch Karl Aberer
GMD-IPSI Integrated Publication and Information Systems Institute
German National Research Center for Information Technology
Dolivostraße 15, D-64293 Darmstadt, Germany
ftesch,abererg@darmstadt.gmd.de
Abstract
With the emergence of fast and standardized communica-
tion infrastructures over which separately designed agents
of different organizations can interact in real-time, there
is an increasing demand for cooperation mechanisms that
allow to carry out inter-organizational cooperations in a
safe way. The lack of external control over an agent’s de-
cisions, resources and actions hamper the usage of tradi-
tional transaction and workflow technology to make self-
interested agents cooperate, i.e., agents cannot not be
forced from a mediating cooperation instance to continue
a cooperation. The challenge is, therefore, to design a co-
operation mechanism that motivates cooperating agents to
carry out a specified contract and, in case of unilateral
defection, ensures that none of the cooperators can bene-
fit from the situation. In this paper, we present a domain
independent framework how non-enforceable cooperations
can be made safe against unilateral defection. We have
developed a utility-based scheduling algorithm that keeps
a cooperation in equilibrium and that motivates agents to
continue a cooperation as long as it is for all participants
beneficial.
1 Introduction
Today, formerly centralized and isolated databases are
connected to each other and are starting to interoperate and
cooperate using electronic networks and EDI, while still
maintaining their autonomy. Complete integration of the
various resources is not adequate for technical and organi-
zational reasons. Hence, new functionality is required to
support interactions among autonomous systems. With the
growth of a fast and inexpensive standardized communica-
tion infrastructure over which separately designed informa-
tion systems belonging to different organizations can inter-
act in real-time, there is an increasing demand for coopera-
tion mechanisms that allow to carry out inter-organizational
transactions in a safe way. This demand is strengthened by
the trend to fast reorganizing enterprise structures that re-
quire to engage in short term inter-enterprise alliances as a
response to dynamic market developments. We refer to an
autonomous information system that carries out tasks and
contracts as an agent.
The lack of external control over an agent’s decisions,
resources and actions hamper the usage of traditional trans-
action and workflow technology to make agents cooper-
ate. Agents acting in non-cooperative environments are
self-motivated and try to maximize their own benefits. A
self-interested agent tends to defect a cooperation unilater-
ally if it expects a benefit from defection. The challenge is,
therefore, to design a cooperation mechanism that motivates
cooperating agents to carry out a cooperation or, in case of
unilateral defection, minimize losses for the opponents.
We present a domain independent framework how inter-
agent cooperations can be made safe. We assume that a
cooperation is safe when it is in an equilibrium state. An
equilibrium state is a state in which all cooperating agents
have almost the same utility (positive or negative) from the
cooperation. We introduce a contract manager that mediates
among cooperating agents and tries to keep the cooperation
in equilibrium. The contract manager comprises a scheduler
that composes inter-agent transactions in order to reach a
subsequent equilibrium state atomically from a given equi-
librium state. The final goal is to reach a state in which no
further improvement for all participants is possible, i.e., all
agents have reached their maximum utility.
The approach addresses complex inter-agent coopera-
tions that cannot be pre-coordinated and controlled from a
central instance. Agents are acting rather dynamically in
order to achieve their goals. Therefore, they are in an on-
going process of adapting their next actions towards their
current goals. With the contract manager presented here,
solutions for interactions are found that cannot be achieved
by direct communication of the participants. With this work
we propose an innovative paradigm for future transaction
and workflow models, in order to cope with the specific
conditions of inter-organizational cooperations. It utilizes
existing research results from the domain of distributed ar-
tificial intelligence in order to progress towards this goal.
We believe that contract managers mediating among au-
tonomous information systems will play a similar role for
inter-organizational cooperations than workflow manage-
ment systems for intra-organizational cooperations.
In Section 2 we present a description of the problem do-
main and outline the solution proposed in this paper. Sec-
tion 3 describes how inter-agent cooperations are specified.
Afterwards, we present in Section 4 the scheduling algo-
rithm for keeping the cooperation in equilibrium and il-
lustrate it by example. We compare our approach in Sec-
tion 6 to related approaches in areas of database transac-
tions, transactional workflows and distributed artificial in-
telligence before we summarize and conclude in Section 7.
2 Cooperation among Agents
An agent is embedded into an organizational structure
where it controls a set of local resources and has specific
capabilities, actions that it can perform, and certain tasks
and responsibilities possibly delegated by a human agent.
The actions can be database actions performed as ordinary
database transactions, or communications, such as provid-
ing some piece of information or sending a message to an-
other agent. An agent tries to act towards a specific goal.
Agents are autonomous in view of their cooperating coun-
terparts. They decide autonomously which actions are per-
formed best in order to achieve a goal. The interests of an
agent can change depending on what it perceives from the
environment [10].
Interactions among agents considered in this paper are
inter-organizational and, thus, purely competitive, involv-
ing self interest and utility maximization. As agents are
autonomous, the factors which influence their behavior are
private and not available to their opponents. Thus, agents
do not know what utilities their opponents place on various
outcomes, they do not know what reasoning models they
employ, they do not know their opponents constraints, and
they do not know whether an agreement is even possible.
Therefore, cooperations among self-interested agents in
open environments include several risks.
 First, self-interest implies that agents are only moti-
vated to engage in a cooperation if it promises to be
individually beneficial. This means, an agent coop-
erates as long as the cooperation maximizes its ex-
pected utility compared to alternative plots. The de-
cision whether the continuation or the abortion of a
cooperation is more beneficial is taken locally by the
agent and cannot be controlled from outside.
 Second, the local reasoning of an agent is based on
uncertain information which leads to suboptimal indi-
vidual decisions. In the light of new information, an
agent can change its course of action. The motivation
for the continuation of a contract is influenced by indi-
vidual interests that may turn out to be conflicting with
current contracts.
 Third, agents may not truthfully provide all informa-
tion they have in the cooperation. It is not always
possible to verify information provided by an agent.
An individual rational agent may expect an advantage
from providing malicious information or from holding
back information.
 Fourth, in open networks it is easily possible to van-
ish in an ongoing cooperation by dropping the network
connection, killing the own process etc. If there is no
real world entity connected with the software agent,
unilateral defection can be a rational option for the
owner. Due to a lack of a legal framework in interna-
tional computer networks, it is not realistic to assume
that a contract can subsequently be enforced by com-
mon laws [14].
A service enabling cooperation among agents has to deal
with the mentioned problems. The major challenge of a co-
operation instance is to give guarantees to the cooperators
that cannot be enforced by the cooperation instance itself,
i.e., the cooperation instance can neither force an agent to
fulfill its obligations nor can it hinder an agent to take a dif-
ferent course of action. The task of the cooperation instance
is to coordinate the exchange among the agents in a way that
the local exchange constraints are not violated and none of
the agents becomes cheated.
Suppose a WWW shopping agent has 3 items in its shop-
ping basket. It does need only 2 of them but the ware-
house offers one item only in a package with another one.
Both parties have to exchange goods and payment bilater-
ally, e.g., due to a missing common law enforceable among
both (agents are located in different countries). There-
fore, neither the electronic store trusts the customer nor
vice versa. Furthermore, both parties have different inter-
ests in the deal. The customer only wants item 1 and item 2
whereas the provider is eager to sell item 2 and item 3 in a
package. Since both parties are not aware of their different
interests, it is impossible for them to perform a success-
ful exchange. When the provider has delivered item 1 and
item 2 the customer might defect the cooperation without
purchasing item 3. On the other hand, the provider might
not be interested to continue the deal after item 2 and item 3
are delivered.
The conflict is to be resolved by the introduction of a
third instance that is aware of the different interests called
the contract manager. Both partners tell the contract man-
ager their personal interests in the deal (utility). The task
of the contract manager is to form a contract acceptable for
both parties and to schedule the exchanges in a way that
considers the individual interests, i.e., none of the partic-
ipants should be motivated during the exchange to defect
the cooperation. The exchange can be performed in mul-
tiple steps in which the interests of the individual agents
can change. We believe that these properties are of interest
for complex asynchronous exchanges like interactive Web
shopping scenarios of long duration or open-ended cooper-
ations like subscriptions in digital libraries. Our mechanism
is of special interest when there is no common law that can
enforce misbehaviors afterwards.
The participants indicate to the contract manager the ac-
tions they are willing to perform by submitting them to the
contract manager. We assume that actions that are submit-
ted are under the control of the contract manager, i.e., the
contract manager decides when they are executed. This can
be the result of the authority of the contract manager re-
sulting from means external to the actual cooperation. In
a second phase, the contract manager notifies the partici-
pants about the existing submissions. The agents can cal-
culate their utilities for the different possible solutions and
send them back to the contract manager. The task of the
contract manager is to compose the submitted actions into
a sequence that satisfies the utilities of all participants and
keeps the contract state in equilibrium. If no solution is
found, the agents are encouraged to either re-evaluate their
utilities or to submit further actions. Otherwise, the con-
tract manager coordinates the execution of the selected se-
quence. The resulting state is an equilibrium state in which
all participant reach almost the same amount of utility. Af-
terwards, the agents can submit further operations, adapt
their utility function and continue the cooperation. With the
proposed mechanism, they may change their interests dur-
ing a contract is active. The set of actions that the agents
are allowed to submit can be fixed in a preceding negotia-
tion phase or, in case of open-ended cooperations, can be
dynamically proposed and extended..
The fact that cooperations are non-enforceable is coun-
teracted with a specific scheduling strategy. One of the
scheduling criterions is to keep the defection motivation of
each participant as low as possible. A low defection motiva-
tion is assumed if the state of the contract is in equilibrium,
i.e., none of the partners has invested significantly more
than its opponents. As long as the contract is in equilibrium,
both participants loose/win the same in case of defection.
Even if one of the participants could do better without dis-
advantaging its opponents in terms of utility, an equilibrium
state is preferable because it increases the probability of a
continuation. Note, the fact that a contract is kept in equi-
librium is no guarantee for well-behaved cooperations but it
increases the probability of well-behaved cooperations.
3 Formal Framework
A cooperation is a sequence of multi-agent agreements,
called contracts, on taking a common course of action medi-
ated through a contract manager. Within a cooperation there
are a set of constraints reflecting the different interests of the
participants. The constraints restrict the different states that
are reachable during a cooperation. Conceptually, the co-
operation can be considered to take place in a shared data
space where each party has different benefits from future
state changes. The goal of the contract manager is to medi-
ate among the participants and find acceptable subsequent
states by means of composing contracts.
For each contract, the cooperation space is defined as a
tuple C = (P; S
0
;O;U) where
 P = fp
1
; : : : ; p
n
g is the set of participants,
 S
0
is the initial state of the cooperation,
 O is the set of actions offered as potential contributions
for one step of the cooperation by the participants p
i
2
P with O
i
 O is the subset of actions offered by
agent p
i
, and
 U is a set of utility functions with U
i
2 U is the utility
function of agent p
i
.
3.1 Participants
We distinguish two kinds of roles which are involved in
a cooperation: the different participants P = fp
1
; : : : ; p
n
g
and the contract manager as intermediary that mediates con-
flicting goals in the cooperation. Participants can act as pro-
ducers, consumers or both. In the context of information
business, producers are document sources, libraries, digital
stores whereas consumers are customers with specific inter-
ests. We assume no general trust among the participants.
3.2 States
When a cooperation is initialized it is in a state S
0
. Con-
ceptually, the state of the cooperation is composed of the
local states of the participating agents. Subsequent states
S of a cooperation are defined by the initial state S
0
and
the actions that have been scheduled resulting in S. With
S = S
0
 [a
1
; : : : a
n
] we denote the state resulting from the
execution of a sequence of actions [a
1
: : : a
n
] with a
i
exe-
cuted before a
j
if i < j.
3.3 Actions
Within a cooperation each agent contributes with the ex-
ecution of local actions. The execution of local actions has
effects on the cooperating partners. Each action can thus
affect multiple participants. This forms the basis of the
cooperation. For instance, if agent i performs the action
pay
i! j
(x) this indicates that i performs a payment action
having effect on j which receives the transferred amount x.
Actions affecting two participants have an initiator which
initiates and controls the execution and a receiver which is
affected by the execution.
The setO contains all actions that are offered by the par-
ticipants in one step of the cooperation. The entire set of
actions that are to be exchanged are not considered formally
here. This can either be a fixed set of actions the opponents
have agreed upon in a prior negotiation process or actions
can be dynamically proposed in each step of the coopera-
tion. The subset O
i
 O contains all actions offered by
agent p
i
in one step of the cooperation including [] refer-
ring to no operation. We define A as all possible execution
sequences that can be constructed from the offered actions
inO withA = f[a
1
; : : : ; a
n
]j8i; j : 1  i; j  n^ a
i
; a
j
2
O ^ a
i
6= a
j
^ 1  n  jOjg.
The set of successor states S that can be constructed
from the current state S
0
and the execution sequences A
is S = S
0
 A.
When an agent has once offered the execution of an ac-
tion, it is assumed that the contract manager can perform the
operation if required. When the contract manager schedules
an action sequence forming a contract, the actions are per-
formed by the participants by means of transactions. The
involved state changes of the local participants are coordi-
nated with a 2 phase commit protocol in which the contract
manager acts as coordinator[11].
3.4 Utility
A key ingredient in the approach presented here, is the
notion of utility which we will use to specify the value, to
an agent, of total or partial achievement of a goal. The defi-
nition of a goal is subsumed by a worth oriented utility func-
tion [13] over the possible action sequences to be executed.
Those states described by action sequences with the high-
est value might be thought of as satisfying the current goals
best, while others, with lower utility values, only partially
satisfy the goal.
The utility of each participant p
i
2 P is a mapping from
all possible successor states of the current state to real num-
bers and defined as
U
i
: S ! <
One way to determine the utility for a state S 2 S given
state S
0
with S = S
0
 [a
1
; : : : ; a
n
] is to calculate util-
ities based on values and costs for reaching S from the
current state S
0
. The utility is then defined as U
i
(S) =
(V
i
(S) C
i
(S)) where V
i
(S) is the value expected from the
execution of [a
1
; : : : ; a
n
],C
i
(S) are the costs to be spent for
performing [a
1
; : : : ; a
n
].
The agents report their utilities for the reachable succes-
sor states to the contract manager. The normalized utility
function
U
i
: S ! [0; 1]
is a mapping from all possible successor states of S
0
to the
interval [0; 1]. The normalization is necessary in order to
perform a fair comparison of interests. We require
8p
i
2 P :
X
S2S
U
i
(S) = 1
in order to ensure that all agents have the same amount of
utility they can distribute among the cooperation space. The
normalized utility function can be calculated from the ordi-
nary utility function with a straight forward algebraic trans-
formation 1.
The normalization ensures that understating the utility
for a successor state S 2 S will always result in an over-
statement for some state S 0 2 S and vice versa. Assuming
that the agents have no information on the utilities reported
by their opponents, with overstating or understating the util-
ity an agent risks to engage in a suboptimal contract. Based
on this assumption, there are no beneficial lies. However,
the cooperating opponents report their utilities only to the
trusted third party which is unbiased towards the partici-
pants.
If the utility functions of the agents are not available
to the contract manager, it can use bounds[15]. Partici-
pants can give lower bounds for V
i
(S) and upper bounds
for C
i
(S) which can be used by the contract manager to
calculate the normalized utility. However, a conservative
choice of bounds will rule out some possible cooperations.
Furthermore, estimation of agents utilities is a subtle task
because it depends on the agents private goals.
4 Contract Management
4.1 Scheduling Algorithm
In our model we assume that cooperating agents ex-
change goods, information, or services among each other.
A cooperation consists of multiple steps. In each step, the
1
U
i
(S) =
U
i
(S) + U
min;i
P
S
0
2S
(U
i
(S
0
) + U
min;i
)
with U
min;i
= min
S2S
U
i
(S)
participants try to compromise among the next actions to be
performed by means of a contract. The concept of worth
oriented utility allows agents to reach agreements, to com-
promise, in situations where agreement had previously been
impossible. First, we generalize the utility evaluation prin-
ciple before we present the protocol and scheduling mecha-
nism of the contract manager.
The task of the contract manager is to find a suitable sub-
sequent state reachable by a contract. Given the cooper-
ation space C = (P; S
0
;O;U) it searches for states with
the properties indicated in the following. For each agent
p
i
2 P , we denote with U
i;nop
= U
i
(S
0
 []) the utility for
no operation which is the execution of the empty sequence
[].
Before the algorithm is given, we define some properties
among the possible subsequent states:
Definition 1 The set of potential successor states D
i
for an
agent p
i
2 P is defined as D
i
= fSjS 2 S ^ U
i
(S) >
U
i;nop
g.
Potential successor states denote those subsequent states
that allow an agent to improve its situation. As long as there
exists a potential successor state for an agent, the agent will
continue the cooperation.
Definition 2 The set of potential successor states D for the
cooperation is defined as D = D
1
\ : : : \D
n
.
The scheduler ensures that each successor state that is
reached, is a potential successor state for all participants.
Definition 3 The set of equilibrium states E for a coopera-
tion is defined as E = fSj8p; q 2 P : jU
p
(S)  U
q
(S)j <
g.
Equilibrium states are states which give the same amount
of utility for both agents. It is expected that equilibrium
states give the highest incentive for all participants to con-
tinue the cooperation. With  we denote the maximum de-
viation in terms of utilities of the resulting state the contract
manager is willing to tolerate. We assume that  is chosen
such that S
0
 [] 2 E which implies that staying in the cur-
rent state is in equilibrium.
Definition 4 A cooperation is in a termination state if D \
E = fg.
The cooperation terminates if there are no potential suc-
cessor states available that are in equilibrium. However, for
multi step cooperations with a fixed set of actions to be ex-
changed, a termination state is also reached if all actions
have been submitted and scheduled. In the last step, the
equilibrium condition can be neglected because there are
no remaining actions to be exchanged. Open-ended cooper-
ations continue until no more potential successor states are
found.
It is the task of the contract manager to find a solution
among the state space that is composed from the possible
execution sequences. Such a compromise should have fol-
lowing properties:
1. Equilibrium: in each subsequent state S, all partic-
ipants should reach the same amount of their utility,
i.e., 8p; q 2 P : p 6= q ^ jU
p
(S)   U
q
(S)j < . The
constant  specifies the maximum deviation of the util-
ities.
2. Monotonicity: the resulting state S 0 after the execu-
tion of a contract should be better than the current state
S in terms of utility, i.e., 8i 2 P : U
i
(S) <= U
i
(S
0
).
This condition could be given up assuming the partic-
ipating agents agree on this. This might be necessary
to enable the agents to cross a local minimum in their
utility functions.
All states that become visible for the participants dur-
ing the cooperation should be equilibrium states. In those
states, none of the participants is motivated to defect the
cooperation because there is an opportunity to improve the
own benefit in further cooperation steps. The equilibrium
condition guarantees safeness of intermediate states by en-
suring that the different utilities do only deviate by a fixed
constant . This avoids states in which one agent has almost
reached a termination state while others are still interested
to compromise on remaining actions.
The Algorithm 1 searches the state space reachable from
the submitted operations in one cooperation step. Input is
the current state S
0
and the actionsO offered by the partic-
ipants. After all possible sequences have been constructed,
all potential successor states that are in equilibrium are col-
lected in H . If H contains more than one solution, the state
where the product of the utilities is maximal is selected be-
cause it provides the best solution of all equilibrium deals
[13].
5 Example
We revisit the example mentioned in Section 2. Assume
there are three exchanges possible among the buyer and the
electronic store fe
1
; e
2
; e
3
g. The buyer is most interested in
e
1
; e
2
and the shopping agent only sells e
2
; e
3
in a package.
With e
i
we denote in this example a full exchange, i.e., de-
livery and payment. The non-additive normalized utilities
for some selected execution sequences are given in table 1.
The entry other captures all remaining sequences unaccept-
able for both agents. States with utilities less than the empty
Algorithm 1 Search next equilibrium state
Input:
S
0
fcurrent stateg
P = 1; : : : ; n fParticipantsg
O = fO
1
; : : : ; O
n
g fActions offeredg
H  ; fExecutions resulting in successor stateg
for all i 2 P do
if [] 62 O
i
then
O
i
 O
i
[ [] finsert empty sequenceg
end if
end for
A = f[a
1
; : : : ; a
n
]j8i; j : 1  i; j  n ^ a
i
; a
j
2 O ^
a
i
6= a
j
^ 1  n  jOjg fConstruction of execution
sequencesg
S  S  A fConstruction of state spaceg
for all h 2 A do
for all i; j 2 P ji 6= j do
if jU
i
(S
0
 h)  U
j
(S
0
 h)j <  ^ (U
i
(S
0
 h) <
U
i
(S
0
 []) ^ U
j
(S
0
 h) < U
j
(S
0
 [])) then
H  H [ fhg
end if
end for
end for
if H 6= ; then
return h such that
Q
n
i=1
U
i
(S  h) maximal
else
return [] fno operations are performedg
end if
Ubuyer Ushop
[] 0.0434 0.074
e
1
0.0869 0.111
e
1
; e
2
0.434 0
e
2
; e
3
0.0869 0.407
e
1
; e
2
; e
3
0.347 0.407
other 0 0
Table 1. Example with non-additive utilities
sequence [] are considered as undesirable states. The algo-
rithm given in Section 4 identifies the sequence [e
1
; e
2
; e
3
]
as possible successor state assuming  >= 0:06. Thus, the
exchange sequence [e
1
; e
2
; e
3
] leads to a subsequent equi-
librium state. Note, the interleaving of e
1
, e
2
and e
3
during
the execution is not of importance because the sequence is
executed atomically by means of transactions.
We consider a second example with separated payment
and delivery actions. AgentA has agreed to buy three docu-
ments (e.g., technical descriptions, digital soundtracks, etc.)
from agent B. The details of the preceding negotiation pro-
cess are not captured here. Both have agreed that the overall
payment is $150 for the documents d1, d2, and d3. Let’s
further assume that agent A pays in units of $50 and each
document has different cost and worth for both agents. The
actions a
1
; a
2
; a
3
transfer the payment from A to B and
b
1
; b
2
; b
3
corresponds to the delivery of the documents.
It is not possible to perform the whole exchange in one
transaction because d1 is not in stock. However, both parties
want to perform those parts of the exchange that are already
possible. This can happen due to non-existence of certain
items which are part of the agreement or simply different
delivery sizes. Furthermore, direct payment of each item
resulting in many payments might also be undesirable due
to the increased transfer fees.
We further assume in this example that both agents
have an expected worth of 0:3 which is calculated from
e
A
= C
A
([a
1
; a
2
; a
3
])   V
A
([b
1
; b
2
; b
3
]) and e
B
=
C
B
([b
1
; b
2
; b
3
])  V
B
([a
1
; a
2
; a
3
]). The utility functions of
A and B are presented in Tables 2 and 3. The rows and
columns in the tables contain the actions forming the re-
spective state. Each entry in the table describes the utility
for all states containing the respective actions, i.e., in this
example the utility function is additive such that an action
is independent from previous and subsequent actions.
In the first step of the exchange A submits all possible
payment actions and B offers all deliveries, i.e., H
A
=
fa
1
; a
2
; a
3
g and H
B
= fb
1
; b
2
; b
3
g. The contract manager
calculates subsequent equilibrium states which are visual-
ized in Table 7. With   0:0004 the successor states in
equilibrium are S
1
= [a
1
; b
1
], S
2
= [a
1
; a
2
; b
2
; b
3
] and
S
3
= [a
1
; a
2
; a
3
; b
1
; b
2
; b
3
]. If, for example, an item can-
not be delivered immediately it may be an option to go first
into S
2
which is an equilibrium state. Then, the remaining
uA
[] a
1
a
1
; a
2
a
1
; a
2
; a
3
[] 0.00 -0.50 -1.00 -1.50
b
1
0.50 0.00 -0.50 -1.00
b
2
0.40 -0.10 -0.60 -1.10
b
3
0.90 0.40 -0.10 -0.60
b
1
; b
2
0.90 0.40 -0.10 -0.60
b
1
; b
3
1.40 0.90 0.40 -0.10
b
2
; b
3
1.20 0.70 0.20 -0.30
b
1
; b
2
; b
3
1.80 1.30 0.80 0.30
Table 2. Utility U
A
u
B
[] a
1
a
1
; a
2
a
1
; a
2
; a
3
[] 0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50
b
1
-0.30 0.20 0.70 1.20
b
2
-0.20 0.30 0.80 1.30
b
3
-0.70 -0.20 0.30 0.80
b
1
; b
2
-0.50 0.00 0.50 1.00
b
1
; b
3
-1.00 -0.50 0.00 0.50
b
2
; b
3
-0.90 -0.40 0.10 0.60
b
1
; b
2
; b
3
-1.20 -0.70 -0.20 0.30
Table 3. Utility U
B
actions can be executed in the next cooperation step.
Both parties have in this state a higher utility than in the
current state and none of them has already reached its max-
imum utility which is in this example the full delivery in
state S
3
. Therefore, both parties will continue the exchange
of the remaining items. Table 6 additionally shows the prod-
uct of the agents utilities which are used as second schedul-
ing criterion to find the best equilibrium state among the
ones found.
Note, for the situation described in the example, there is
no exchange possible with  = 0. The next state in which
both agents have exactly the same utility is where the full
delivery has occurred.
When the contract manager cannot find a subsequent
equilibrium state there are different options:
 Notification of participants to submit further actions
that allow to reach an equilibrium state.
 Increase which allows to mark more states as equilib-
rium states. This is critical since it affects the safeness
of the contract state.
 Request the participants to relax their goals by means
of changing the utility function.
A further option would be to compensate exchanges al-
ready performed to return to a previous equilibrium state.
However, taking into account that agents can adapt their
utility function for each exchange, this method appears not
as promising. Furthermore, compensation of already re-
ceived information is in many cases not possible.
U
A
[] a
1
a
1
; a
2
a
1
; a
2
; a
3
[] 0.0143 0.0095 0.0048 0.0000
b
1
0.0191 0.0143 0.0095 0.0048
b
2
0.0181 0.0134 0.0086 0.0038
b
3
0.0229 0.0181 0.0134 0.0086
b
1
; b
2
0.0229 0.0181 0.0134 0.0086
b
1
; b
3
0.0277 0.0229 0.0181 0.0134
b
2
; b
3
0.0258 0.0210 0.0162 0.0115
b
1
; b
2
; b
3
0.0315 0.0267 0.0219 0.0172
Table 4. Normalized utility U
A
U
B
[] a
1
a
1
; a
2
a
1
; a
2
; a
3
[] 0.0139 0.0197 0.0255 0.0313
b
1
0.0104 0.0162 0.0220 0.0278
b
2
0.0116 0.0174 0.0231 0.0289
b
3
0.0058 0.0116 0.0174 0.0231
b
1
; b
2
0.0081 0.0139 0.0197 0.0255
b
1
; b
3
0.0023 0.0081 0.0139 0.0197
b
2
; b
3
0.0035 0.0093 0.0150 0.0208
b
1
; b
2
; b
3
0.0000 0.0058 0.0116 0.0174
Table 5. Normalized utility U
B
[] a
1
a
1
; a
2
a
1
; a
2
; a
3
[] 0.00019879 0.00018775 0.00012148 0.00000000
b
1
0.00019879 0.00023192 0.00020984 0.00013253
b
2
0.00020984 0.00023192 0.00019879 0.00011044
b
3
0.00013253 0.00020984 0.00023192 0.00019879
b
1
; b
2
0.00018554 0.00025180 0.00026285 0.00021867
b
1
; b
3
0.00006405 0.00018554 0.00025180 0.00026285
b
2
; b
3
0.00008946 0.00019437 0.00024407 0.00023855
b
1
; b
2
; b
3
0.00000000 0.00015462 0.00025401 0.00029819
Table 6. product of utilities U
A
 U
B
[] a
1
a
1
; a
2
a
1
; a
2
; a
3
[] 0.0004 -0.0101 -0.0207 -0.0313
b
1
-0.0087 0.0019 -0.0124 -0.0230
b
2
-0.0066 -0.0040 -0.0146 -0.0251
b
3
-0.0171 -0.0066 -0.0040 -0.0146
b
1
; b
2
-0.0148 -0.0042 -0.0063 -0.0169
b
1
; b
3
-0.0254 -0.0148 -0.0042 -0.0063
b
2
; b
3
-0.0223 -0.0117 0.0012 -0.0094
b
1
; b
2
; b
3
-0.0315 0.0209 -0.0104 0.0002
Table 7. jU
A
  U
B
j <  as positive numbers,
others negative
6 Related Work
This section compares the problem that we are address-
ing to related work in the area of distributed database trans-
actions, workflow management systems, and distributed ar-
tificial intelligence.
In the traditional view of a database transactions [4], the
systems aims at maintaining a consistent state. Consistency
is based on the assumption that a single transaction is cor-
rect and that no anomalies are introduced due to interleaved
execution of transactions. Transaction are under the control
of a single party. Two phase commit protocols are ways of
ensuring that all participants of a transaction commit to the
state change or none of them [11]. Our approach differs in
that there are different interests among the participants and,
thus, the transaction (cooperation) is under the control of
several instances. We introduce a quality measure on states
that give each participant its own view on the next preferred
consistent state. In contrast to a traditional transaction man-
ager which re-orders actions to a serializable schedule or a
cooperative transaction manager which governs the execu-
tion sequences according to a specification, the role of the
contract manager is to mediate among the different interests
by generating schedules that reach equilibrium states.
Recent extensions of transaction models discuss com-
plementary aspects of the work presented here. In [2] I-
transactions are introduced. They provide atomicity for a
set of actions triggered by a user upon different and not a-
priori known DBMS. The work in [7] considers how ex-
changes can occur among chains of multiple parties con-
nected through brokers and distrusting each other.
The ADEPT project [6, 12, 5] addresses the problem of
agent interoperation in domains such as business process
management. ADEPT takes a distributed approach where
the disparate components of a business process are each
represent by an agent. Agents retain control over their own
resources , the tasks that they perform, and their communi-
cation and coordination with other agents. The architecture
supports the encapsulation of services through a hierarchy
of agencies, and so enables abstract services that are ne-
gotiated among the agents. Agents try to reach mutually
acceptable agreements on the execution of services through
a negotiation protocol. The approach emphasizes the nego-
tiation aspect rather than how agreements can be enforced
without central control. Other agent based workflow ap-
proaches are [18, 3, 9] which rely on distributed event con-
dition action rules. To the best of our knowledge, decision
autonomy of participating components is not considered.
Research in distributed artificial intelligence aims at
models for communication and cooperation among intelli-
gent automated systems. An overview is given in [8]. The
mechanism presented in this paper exploits research results
from game theory. Research on game theoretic approaches
to agent negotiation [13, 21] has focused on the definition
of cooperation protocols that give no benefit to agents that
misrepresent or hide information. In [17] disclosure of in-
formation is acceptable, because it will help an agent to find
an optimal solution for itself. This also holds for the solu-
tion presented here. It has been argued in [19] that some
assumption of classical game-theoretic approaches limit the
applicability of game theory to solve real problems.
[15, 14] has investigated how exchanges can be carried
out among agents without the involvement of a third party.
The basic idea of the proposed mechanism is making the
present less important compared to the future (initially sug-
gested by [1]). An exchange module schedules an agents
deliveries in such a way that the opponent is not motivated
to defect at any point during the exchange. The approach is
based on linear increasing utility functions for each cooper-
ating agent. Therefore, the tradeoff of an agent increases as
long as the cooperation continuous. Although the exchange
is scheduled in a way that an agents future gains are higher
than its future costs it cannot be guaranteed that defection
may be at no point individually rational. The approach re-
quires that the agents know their utilities or at least upper
and lower bounds of the opponents utility functions. Due
to the fact that in the approach presented in this paper the
utilities are only applicable by the contract manager, they
are not shared between the agents.
Recent work on coalition formation analyzes coalitions
among self-interested agents. By forming a coalition and
acting jointly agents can save costs in contrast to acting in-
dividually. [20] presents a mechanism for coalition forma-
tion in task oriented domains. The work presented in [16]
investigates coalitions among self-interested agents which
need to solve combinatorial optimization problems.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we have present a domain independent
framework how inter-agent cooperations can be made safe
against defection. A cooperation is safe when it is in an
equilibrium state. An equilibrium state is a state in which
all cooperating agents have almost the same utility from the
cooperation. We have introduced the contract manager that
mediates among cooperating agents and tries to keep the
cooperation in equilibrium. The presented scheduling algo-
rithm composes sequences resulting in a subsequent equi-
librium state. The presented model motivates the partici-
pants in a cooperation to carry out the cooperation and, in
case of unilateral defection, ensures that a defector cannot
profit from the situation.
In future work we intend to extent the basic model pre-
sented here in several ways. First, inter-agent and intra-
agent action dependencies should be taken in consideration,
e.g., agents may want to define sequences they want to have
scheduled atomically or in certain orders etc. Such pref-
erences can currently only be expressed via utilities. For
this problem class a more elaborated scheduling algorithm
will be developed. Second, under specific circumstances it
might be useful that the scheduler enters possibly on be-
half of an agent non-equilibrium states. This functionality
is required if one participant is willing to take risk in or-
der to carry out a formerly impossible exchange. Third, a
natural extension would be if the contract manager provides
means for insurance. Depending on the assurance, the con-
tract manager can take risk if it can calculate the probability
for unilateral defection. Different kinds of insurance are
possible, e.g., the insurance can compensate losses up to
some value previously agreed.
Acknowledgments
The authors thank Peter Fankhauser for inspiring discus-
sions on the topic and his valuable comments to the normal-
ization of utility which helped to avoid safe beneficial lies
by overstating or understating utility.
References
[1] R. Axelrod. The Evolution of Cooperation. Basic Books,
1984.
[2] D. Billard. Transactional services for the internet. In Proc. of
the Int. Workshop on the Web and Databases, pages 11–17,
Valencia, Spain, 1998.
[3] A. Geppert, M. Kradolfer, and D. Tombros. Realization of
cooperative agents using an active object-oriented database
management system. In Proc. of the second Int. Workshop
on Rules in Database Systems, Athens, Greece, September
1995.
[4] J. Gray and A. Reuter. Transaction Processing: Concepts
and Techniques. Morgan Kaufmann Publishers, Inc., 1993.
[5] N. R. Jennings, P. Faratin, P. Johnsen, T. J. Norman,
P. O’Brien, and M. E. Wiegand. Agent-based business pro-
cess management. International Journal of Cooperative In-
formation Systems, 1996.
[6] N. R. Jennings, P. Faratin, T. J. Norman, P. O’Brien, M. E.
Wiegand, C. Voudouris, J. L. Alty, T. Miah, and E. Mam-
dani. Adept: Managing business processes using intelligent
agents. In Proc. of the BCS Expert Systems 1996 Confer-
ence, pages 5–23, 1996.
[7] S. P. Ketchpel and H. Garcia-Molina. Making trust explicit
in distributed commerce transactions. In Proc. of the IEEE
Int. Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, 1996.
[8] S. Kraus. Negotiation and cooperation in multi-agent envi-
ronments. Artificial Intelligence, 94:79–97, 1997.
[9] P. C. Lockemann and H.-D. Walter. Object-oriented proto-
col hierachies for distributed workflow systems. Theory and
Practice of Object Systems, 1(4):281–300, 1995.
[10] P. Maes. Modeling adaptive autonomous agents. Artificial
Life Journal, 1(1), 1994.
[11] C. Mohan and B. Lindsay. Efficient commit protocols for
the tree of processes model of distributed transactions. In
Proc. of the second ACM SIGACT-SIGOPS Symposium on
Principles of Distributed Computing, pages 378–396, Au-
gust 1983.
[12] T. J. Norman, N. R. Jennings, P. Faratin, and E. Mamdani.
Designing and implementing a multi-agent architecture for
business process management. In Proc. of the third Int.
Workshop on Agent Theories, Architectures, and Languages,
1996.
[13] J. S. Rosenschein and G. Zlotkin. Rules of Encounter:
Designing Conventions for Automated Negotiation Among
Computer. MIT press, 1994.
[14] T. Sandholm and V. Lesser. An exchange protocol without
enforcement. In Proc. of the 11th Int. Workshop on Dis-
tributed Artificial Intelligence, Washington, USA, 1994.
[15] T. W. Sandholm and V. R. Lesser. Equilibrium analysis of
the possibilities of unenforced exchange in multiagent sys-
tems. In Proc. of the 14th Int. Joint Conference on Artificial
Intelligence, pages 694–701, Montreal, Canada, 1995.
[16] T. W. Sandholm and V. R. Lesser. Coalitions among com-
putationally bounded agents. Artificial Intelligence, 94:99–
137, 1997.
[17] C. Sierra, P. Faratin, and N. R. Jennings. A service-oriented
negotiation model between autonomous agents. Lecture
Notes in Artificial Intelligence, 1237:17–35, 1997.
[18] D. Tombros, A. Geppert, and K. R. Dittrich. Semantics of
reactive components in event-driven workflow execution. In
Proc. of the 9th Int. Conference on Advanced Information
Systems Engineering, Barcelona, Spain, June 1997.
[19] D. Zeng and K. Sycara. How can an agent learn to negoti-
ate? In Proc. of the third Int. Workshop on Agent Theories,
Architectures, and Languages, 1996.
[20] G. Zlotkin and J. Rosenschein. Coalition, cryptography, and
stability: Mechanisms for coalition formation in task ori-
ented domains. In Proceedings AAAI, Seattle, WA, USA,
1994.
[21] G. Zlotkin and J. S. Rosenschein. Negotiation and task shar-
ing among autonomous agents in cooperative domains. In
Proc. of the 11th Int. Joint Conference on Artificial Intel-
ligence, pages 912–917, Detroit, Michigan, USA, August
1989.
